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Each natural event that affects urban regions reveals the limitations of present risk management 
strategies and shows the prevailing importance of technical systems before, during and after each 
crisis. The response of such systems to risk can be discussed in terms of resilience. Resilience is a 
concept that applies generally to systems, and concerns the capacity to absorb a disturbance and 
to return to a viable state. In the context of urban technical systems, one element of a resilience 
strategy is to analyse the technical constraints that apply to the design, management and adoption 
of technical systems. This paper presents the design of a conceptual model presenting the various 
possible resilience strategies applied to urban technical systems. 
This conceptual resilience model for technical systems is based on the identification of four com-
plementary types of resilience: i. cognitive resilience, linked to knowledge and culture; ii. func-
tional resilience, representing the capacity of a technical system to protect itself from major dam-
age while continuing to provide at least the services needed by critical infrastructure; functional 
resilience of technical services seeking intrinsically to increase their own resilience; iii. correlative 
resilience that characterises the relationship between service demand and the capacity of the 
technical system to respond. It is a matter of adapting demand to technical system capacity: de-
creasing demand enables a system to remain in operation and to recover more quickly. Internal 
system organisation as well as links between technical systems and other regions may also be a 
factor in the resilience of technical systems. iv. Organisational resilience expresses the capacity to 
mobilise an area much wider than the one affected.
Key woRds: Resilience, Conceptual model, Urban engineering, Net-
works, Floods, Urban, City, Technical systems
Editors’ note: This paper is a revised version of an article originally published in French 
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Since 2007, half the world population has lived in urban areas 
(UN-Habitat, 2007). The growth rate is equivalent to build-
ing a new city of one million inhabitants a week1. This means 
natural hazards cause major human and material damage to 
cities. The financial cost of damage is increasing rapidly and 
various insurance systems are changing in order to maintain 
their financial balance.
On a more local scale, experience shows that the success 
or failure of technical networks is of crucial importance 
in managing urban risks. Many urban malfunctions are 
linked to technical system malfunction and their criticality 
(Serre, 2011). In such a context, technical systems must be 
analysed with a two-pronged approach: not simply analysing 
the technical constraints involved in network design and 
management, but also analysing their physical, political and 
social context. Urban technical systems are “actors”2 within 
a region and play a major role in local risk management. In 
that sense, urban technical systems form a structured set of 
technical functions that supply a service in response to a need. 
They are made up of technical and organisational elements, 
as well as methods and agents, and are integrated in urban 
areas. At present, risk management in urban engineering 
has focussed on network reliability, leading to reliability-
based methods concerned particularly with building strength, 
network meshing (Lhomme et al., 2013b), and network 
interdependency (Robert & Morabito, 2009). The cost of 
these methods, and their failure to prevent malfunctions in 
the event of natural disasters, are evidence of the limitations 
of a strategy that isolates networks and does not consider 
technical systems as a whole, and of the importance of 
technical systems in urban natural hazard management. New 
1  www.floodresiliencegroup.org
2 This concept of actor has been used in various sociological papers. It is used 
here to express the desire to include (human) actors and technical systems 
within the same analysis.
urban flood risk management strategies, for example, need to 
be contemplated (Zevenbergen et al., 2011). 
We suggest that to improve on present methods and thus con-
tribute to the renewal of urban engineering, there should be 
a focus on resilience, defined as the persistence of relation-
ships within a system. There are numerous definitions and un-
derstandings of the term resilience (Aschan-Leygonie, 2000; 
Reghezza et al., 2012). According to Holling (1973), measuring it 
means assessing the system’s capacity to absorb and integrate 
changes in its components. He states that since systems evolve 
permanently, they are not characterised by a state of equilibri-
um but by a general stability, namely their continued operation. 
So, when a disturbance occurs, either the system can integrate 
it without its viability being jeopardised, or it cannot and sooner 
or later it will deteriorate because of the change in its structure 
(Sanders, 1992). Resilience implies the system is proactive re-
garding risk: the internal features of the urban system supply it 
with action-oriented risk analysis tools that enable it to respond 
appropriately to risk (Pelling, 2003). In addition to the objective 
of minimising the consequences of a disturbance, a number 
of authors consider system disturbance as an opportunity for 
urban planning (Pasche & Geisler, 2005). The capacity for re-
sponse, but also for adaptation and absorption, then becomes 
central in describing a system as resilient and in approaching 
risk within dynamic systems (Serre, 2011). 
To date, experiments with technical systems have led to some 
resilient approaches that challenge customary risk manage-
ment strategies; however, these approaches remain specific 
and at present there is no common framework to analyse the 
proposed strategies. The aim of this article is to develop a con-
ceptual resilience model in order to guide the implementation 
of resilience strategies and to build a reference framework for 
mediation, exchanges and description of the strategies. The 
main parameters are identified on the basis of experiments 
and methods in the field of flood risk management that are 
part of a resilience approach applied to urban technical sys-
tems.
2. uRBAn developMenT And flood RIsKs
The economic cost of flood risks in cities is growing (Ashley et 
al., 2007; EEA, 2008; EEA, 2012; European Commission, 2013), 
and understanding it requires integrating multiple aggravat-
ing factors such as urban development, climate change and 
all possible causes of flooding (Blanksby et al., 2009). Urban 
growth usually affects the outskirts of existing cities and con-
sequently goes hand in hand with urban spread. Cities there-
fore cover increasingly large areas that can be subjected to 
various other natural hazards (earthquakes, avalanches, etc.). 
At local level, this development brings added man-made (e.g. 
technological) hazards and magnifies natural hazards such as 
flooding. Indeed, soil sealing as a result of urbanisation in-
creases runoff and restricts infiltration. Heavy rainfall results 
in storm water flooding locally, and generally an increase in 
downstream water flow that can induce further floods caused 
by rivers overflowing. The economic cost is already very high 
and will probably reach 100 billion euros a year globally by the 
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end of the century (EEA, 2008; EEA, 2012). It is estimated that 
almost 75% of damages occur in urban areas (Ashley et al., 
2007). Insurance systems are evolving so as to limit increases.
In view of these challenges, it appears that an approach of 
increasing urban density would help to generate greater 
energy efficiency, reduce mobility-related environmental 
costs, and preserve outlying agricultural land. While urban 
spread generates overall risks (significant CO2 impact) and 
local ones (runoff), a move towards dense and compact cities 
will necessarily lead to an exploration of the building capcities 
of urban areas that are subjected to natural hazards, in 
particular flood-prone areas3.
Urbanisation, like climate change, has generated uncertainties 
in risk assessment. At present, experts from the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) propose several scenarios 
for climate change, all of which predict an impact on the frequen-
cy and amount of rainfall. More severe droughts will alternate 
with heavier rainfall (Lamarre, 2008). These droughts could have 
a direct impact on floods by reducing soil infiltration. Heavier 
rainfall on less permeable soil diminishes the response time of 
watersheds, thus increasing the risk of flooding. Floods caused 
by higher sea levels are also to be feared. Climate change com-
bined with the concentration of goods and people in urban areas 
foreshadows devastating events in the coming years. Yet the un-
certainties linked to data reliability and availability are such that 
currently, the results generated by mathematical models cannot 
be considered reliable (Barroca, 2006). In such a context, how can 
risk be efficiently managed, flood forecast models be produced, 
and flood protection structures be sized? 
The economic, urban and climate situation, as well as the 
increasingly fragile situation of society faced with natural 
hazards, highlight the need to develop new flood risk 
management strategies. The increasing number of disasters and 
victims reveals the failure of over five decades of disaster control 
(Gaillard et al., 2010). New strategies will have to be developed 
to anticipate flood scenarios that probabilistic models deem at 
present to be extreme or rare (Zevenbergen et al., 2011). This 
also implies setting those strategies in a long-term sustainable 
development context where societies will have to learn to live 
with natural disasters within their local area and above all learn 
to recover from them (Sanseverino-Godfrin, 2009 ; Lallau, 2011). 
3.  IMpoRTAnCe of uRBAn TeChnICAl 
sysTeMs In RIsK MAnAgeMenT 
Although urban development must give preference to com-
pactness, the growing dependency of cities on urban technical 
systems implies special forms of urbanisation that have given 
rise to the term “reticular” in the field of urban planning (Dupuy, 
1991). Spatially, contemporary cities no longer have functional 
continuity. They depend heavily on urban technical systems, 
3  In France, in spite of stringent building regulations in flood-prone areas, land 
pressure has led to the erection of housing, and office and business premises. 
For instance, the Val-de-Marne Department in the outskirts of Paris has a 
high housing construction rate in flood-prone areas (over 8 000 housing units 
were built between 1999 and 2006).
which create a spatial organisation within the region. Invisible 
links to urban systems guide urban development without fully 
constraining it. Technical systems can be defined on the basis of 
services rendered, organisation (functional aspects), and infra-
structure (physical aspects, equipment, and whatever means 
are necessary to render services) (Blancher, 1998). Thus, public 
transport, supply systems for electricity, gas, telephone, fibre 
optics, district heating and waste management are technical 
systems. They are usually described as complex because of 
their interdependency (Toubin et al., 2012b). 
The analysis of feedback from cities damaged by floods shows 
both the dependency of urban operation on technical systems 
and the dissemination of the effects of flooding through those 
same systems. A study of urban technical systems under 
constraint (natural and/or technological hazards) shows they are 
intrinsically vulnerable and that their malfunction increases the 
vulnerability of the region (Felts, 2005; Vigneron et al., 2006).
The high dependence of a city on its technical systems means 
they have huge importance in risk dissemination. Technical 
systems have already been identified as key to improving city 
resilience (Lhomme et al., 2010). They behave as propagators 
of malfunctions both because of their geographical extent 
and their interdependency (Lhomme et al., 2013a) while at the 
same time they are essential for reconstruction (Felts, 2005). 
They are the city’s “nervous system” in which the slightest 
breakdown can have knock-on effects for urban operation 
(Robert & Morabito, 2009). 
The most indispensable services are described as essential 
or critical (Robert & Morabito, 2009; Barthélémy et al., 2011). 
Analysis of such critical urban technical systems is based on 
two linked concepts: 
•	The concept of critical (essential, vital) infrastructure: 
an infrastructure can be defined as a set of facilities 
ensuring services necessary for a city to operate (ASCE, 
2009). It is deemed critical if its failure threatens the 
safety, economy, lifestyle and public health of a city, a 
region, or even a state. These critical infrastructures 
are specific in that they go beyond geographical, 
political, cultural and organisational boundaries (Boin & 
McConnell, 2007).
•	The concept of system interdependency: most criti-
cal infrastructures interact. Yet this interaction is often 
complex and poorly known understood because it goes 
beyond the boundaries of the system in question. Ana-
lysing interdependencies requires a change of scale in 
order to analyse first the components of a system (fine 
scale), then the links between systems (wider scale). 
Various studies on critical infrastructure vulnerability 
can be called upon (Petit, 2009). The most representative 
are certainly those of Benoit Robert (Robert & Morabito, 
2009; Robert et al., 2009). His work, based on actual cas-
es in Montreal, shows the series of failures engendered 
by the temporary stoppage of part of a technical system 
(Robert & Hémond, 2012).
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4.  CognITIve ResIlIenCe, KnowIng RIsK 
In All ITs dIMensIons 
In order to draw up regional strategies for resilience, it is 
necessary to characterise the needs of regions during or 
after crises on different spatial scales and on the basis of 
actual situations. In this approach, networks and flows need 
to be considered and analysed in assessment methodologies 
by drawing on local population knowledge and local actors’ 
experiences. Cognitive resilience refers to all processes 
relating to knowledge, such as the memory and learning 
of risk. It also expresses the processes of identification, 
acquisition and processing of information, such as reasoning, 
memory, and decision-making, as well as more elementary 
processes such as the perception of risk, or the attention 
paid to it (Wisner et al., 2004). Without being exhaustive, these 
processes facilitate organisational or operational flexibility, 
coordination, partnerships, identification of vital networks 
(water, electricity, communications and actors) in terms 
of operation and interdependency, as well as innovation, 
autonomy and anticipation capacities (adaptation and capacity 
to rebound). 
This cognitive dimension goes beyond “human cognition” 
and refers to risk identification and evaluation of resilience 
factors, as well as the methods and tools that can be used 
to measure them. This defines the capacity of the service to 
know the needs of the urban system and the influence it will 
have on the technical systems during and after the crisis, and 
even the mutual influences and needs of the technical systems 
themselves. There are experimental attempts to establish a 
dialogue between the actors of the various technical systems 
in order to map their dependencies (Toubin et al., 2012a). 
If the services are identified as vital for society and therefore 
must operate reliably (which managers can usually do 
independently from each other), interdependencies between 
technical systems quickly appear as critical. This is because 
functional interdependencies (e.g. the transport network uses 
the telecommunication network to manage traffic which in 
turn uses the electricity network) does not necessarily mean 
there is cooperation between the many different managers 
involved (Toubin et al., 2012b). Actors report inadequacies and 
discrepancies between, for example, model outcomes and 
actual situations, or between the scales of available data and 
tools they are supposed to provide.
Consider the example of flood-produced waste management. 
In addition to safety and public health issues, disposing of this 
waste is an issue for overall post-crisis management and a 
return to normal. It is in fact the very first stage of a return 
to normal so as to hand the region back to its occupants and 
its activities. It is essential for human safety, in particular by 
ensuring free movement first of rescue services and authori-
ties, then of local people. Newly produced waste considerably 
increases urban system demand on waste management ser-
vices. In such a case, downgraded or normal operation is im-
possible due to the huge quantities of waste4 involved, and the 
fact that the waste can be wet, polluted and no longer adapted 
to treatment methods. In order to anticipate, organise and plan 
post-flood waste management, it would seem that estimating 
the quantity and nature of the waste produced is a prerequi-
site on several levels. This step is necessary to determine the 
material and human resources required, the partnerships to 
establish, and the spaces to make available so as to provide 
an adapted response that respects the environment and hu-
man health. 
Estimating waste production helps to raise political aware-
ness of the issue, which is all too often poorly known and 
therefore overlooked by the authorities. Without quantitative 
data, the problem can seem abstract and it is difficult to un-
derstand its importance. Making it clear that, on the one hand, 
a region may have to confront several years worth of waste 
(some of which may impact the environment and have short, 
medium, or long term effects on health and safety), and, on 
the other hand, that inadequate anticipation of how to manage 
such a quantity of waste could threaten the economic activity 
of a region for several years (as in New Orleans following the 
flood caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005), can help to mobi-
lise decision-makers about the issue (CEPRI, 2013).
Apart from the financial cost, representing a little over 25% of 
the total cost of regional recovery (FEMA, 2007), anticipating 
and planning post-flood waste management is a major aspect 
of resilience. Lack of knowledge, information and awareness 
of actors on this subject is at present the major hindrance to 
the setting up of resilience strategies (Beraud, 2013).
5.  funCTIonAl ResIlIenCe As The 
CApACITy To MAInTAIn CRITICAl 
InfRAsTRuCTuRe In seRvICe. 
There are different methods for assessing the reliability 
of a technical system and a critical infrastructure in order 
to manage urban risks. These methods focus on both the 
relationships between the infrastructures (which are strongly 
interdependent) and their relationships with the elements of their 
local environment. There are methods for analysing physical 
and statistical (mathematical) risks according to experts, and 
others arising from Operational Safety (UNIT, 2014). Just like 
physical approaches, Operational Safety is an internal method, 
in that it is based on a thorough knowledge of the system under 
study (Serre et al., 2008). Physical modelling of the continuous 
or discrete system degradation processes is based on equations 
that govern internal phenomena. Operational Safety modelling 
is based on the principle of functional modelling, and consists 
in determining the interactions between the components of a 
system and its environment so as to formally establish the links 
between functional failures, their causes and effects (Gervais 
et al., 2011). 
4  In 2002, in Prague 270 000 tonnes of waste were produced, and their disposal 
took eleven months. In Dresden that same year, production was equivalent 
to three years of collection. Following the storm Xynthia in 2010, waste 
production was equivalent to twelve “normal years” for the towns of La Faute 
sur Mer and L’Aiguillon sur Mer.
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Using these methods to analyse failure scenarios and model 
interdependency processes between complex systems yields 
relevant results. However, while these methods generally 
apply to complex systems, they do not necessarily apply to 
systems of complex systems, i.e. strongly interdependent 
systems. Using a combination of methods stemming from Op-
erational Safety, it is possible to model failure scenarios for 
systems of complex systems by analysing each system more or 
less independently of the others (Lhomme et al., 2011). First, 
the principle involves considering the various infrastructures 
as part of a single system, and carrying out a general external 
functional analysis. In a second stage, an internal functional 
analysis is carried out for each critical infrastructure and op-
erational safety methods are used. Some promising recent 
studies (Serre, 2011) have made use of Failure Modes and Ef-
fects Analysis (FMEA), which is an inductive analysis method 
of potential system failures that considers each component 
of the system and analyses its failure modes. It is based on 
the systematic listing and assessment of potential error risks 
that may occur at all stages of system operation. Its output 
is a table which, for each component, establishes the causes 
and effects of the component’s disruption. FMEA was adapted 
to various civil engineering fields in the late nineties (Serre et 
al., 2007).
Functional Analysis and FMEA have been applied for all urban 
technical systems, and at this stage completing Functional 
Analysis and FMEA using a spatial approach seems relevant for 
applying the concept of resilience (Lhomme et al., 2010). This 
application deals with the reliability of critical infrastructure 
on three levels: overall connectivity of the network, component 
resistance, and the capacity of the technical system to operate 
in downgraded modes that do not lead to total breakdown of 
the service it provides. Maintaining the functioning of the most 
important infrastructures is known as functional resilience. 
Functional resilience is implemented by working on reliability, 
increased redundancy and risk-related stock management. 
Making structures reliable implies overprotecting them 
compared to normal situations. Stock management generally 
involves creating temporary or permanent storage facilities 
as close as possible to the place of use. Finally, redundancy 
relates to surplus: in a network, it is measured by the capacity 
to find different pathways5 or to use several action modes for 
the same service.
6.  CoRRelATIve ResIlIenCe As A 
TendenCy To AdApT needs  
To seRvICe CApACITy.
Because crises are rare and difficult to predict, it can be difficult 
to raise the funds required for technical system adaptation. 
This generally leads to under-adaptation, and increased 
costs when crises do occur. Yet other approaches that do not 
derive from Operational Safety have appeared and throw new 
light on how to plan risk management for technical systems. 
These approaches are based on identifying and analyzing 
5  There can be various redundancy indicators, some developed to assess the 
vulnerability of technical systems to flood risks (Lhomme et al., 2011). 
climate change adaptation strategies. Various methods are 
being introduced in practice to support resilience-oriented 
implementation. The most interesting one, because it goes 
beyond mere observation and provides operational guidance, 
is called Adaptation Tipping Points (ATP) (Kwadijk et al., 2010). 
This method was applied to the case study of an existing 
technical system (rainwater disposal) in Wielwijk on the 
outskirts of Dordrecht (Netherlands) (Gersonius, 2012). First, 
the method assesses planned risk management strategies 
to find out whether they will still be efficient in future, more 
demanding, conditions. The ATP method helps to determine 
both the time point at which the extent of climate change is 
such that strategies will become inoperative, and the role and 
functions of the system under consideration as well as the 
acceptable degradation level. The ATPs are identified at the 
end of this stage. If technical system performance becomes 
unacceptable, it is necessary to change strategies and take 
adaptation measures. At that stage, various structural and 
non-structural options must be proposed and assessed.
It is then necessary to engage with all the stakeholders in 
order to select a realistic and acceptable adaptation strategy. 
The implementation of the strategy must change the nature 
and timetable of the critical ATPs. If efficient strategies are too 
costly or unacceptable for society and/or the environment, the 
acceptable level of risk must be reworked and changed. 
The iterative part required to implement realistic and shared 
solutions reflects a reversal of the conventional approach to 
risk management, since the most innovative side of the ATP 
method lies not so much in establishing a link between the 
boundary conditions of the technical system – changes in 
the hazard and use dependency of the technical system – 
as in changes in the level of acceptability. ATPs express the 
search for a link between the risk of technical system service 
reduction or stoppage and acceptability of the reduction. There 
is recognition that service and use form a single set whose 
parts are in mutual correspondence. None of the parts can 
change without the others also changing: technical system 
resilience is possible when correlation between service and 
use remains acceptable throughout the risk period.
7.  oRgAnIsATIonAl ResIlIenCe  
As A MeAsuRe To AdApT To A CRIsIs,  
And pRoMoTe ABsoRpTIon And  
posT-CRIsIs ReCoveRy 
Apart from adapting infrastructures and buildings (functional 
resilience) and adapting needs to service capacity (correlative 
resilience), each disturbance also reveals the capacity of the 
regional organisation to cope with them. Even when organi-
sation is taken into account, for instance in service continuity 
plans, it generally remains internal to the service or the com-
pany. To our knowledge, there is no method providing flexible 
response capacities to express the resilience of a technical 
system as regards its regional organisation. A study of the 
bibliography specific to risk geography has not uncovered a 
theoretical framework that defines precisely this form of re-
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silience. However, most studies discuss resilience in relation 
to the concepts of absorption or recovery6 (Campanella, 2006; 
Hernandez, 2009). This capacity of regional organisations to 
promote post-damage recovery also applies to technical sys-
tems. Various cases could be presented, but the experience of 
Storm Xynthia that hit France on 27th February 2010 is a good 
example. 
Xynthia was caused by a low pressure system with severe 
winds blowing at about 160km/h that hit Europe between 
26th February and 1st March 2010. This coincided with a tidal 
coefficient7 of 102, and flooding ensued, particularly in various 
French coastal areas in the Charente Maritime, Vendée and 
Côtes d’Armor. Human casualties were high, with 65 people 
dying in Europe, including 53 in France. French coasts were 
severely damaged, at an estimated cost of €457m in public 
expenses and of €690m for insurance companies (Migaud & 
Bertrand, 2012).
During the storm, the equivalent of twelve years of waste pro-
duction8 was generated overnight in the towns of La Faute-
sur-Mer and L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer. The municipalities respon-
sible for household waste collection and the waste treatment 
syndicate (Trivalis) had to deal with this new and exceptionally 
large production while attempting to continue treating “nor-
mal” waste. Measures adapted to the situation were put in 
place. This capacity to respond can be explained by a combina-
tion of several factors, basically linked to waste management, 
regional organisation and the capacity to call on support from 
outside the sector. On the one hand, the area covered by the 
Trivalis waste treatment syndicate includes the Vendée De-
partment. On the other hand, only the towns of La Faute-sur-
Mer and L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer were severely hit by the storm 
(Beraud et al., 2013).
This meant the significant resources Trivalis could call on at 
Departmental level considerably boosted waste management 
and limited its impact on the towns. The availability of Trivalis 
staff and equipment also meant the region benefited from 
guidance that enhanced solidarity between local actors 
(businesses, farmers, etc.) and neighbouring towns. Finally, 
it should be noted that few management infrastructures 
(particularly for treatment) were affected. 
However, although the waste management system was ca-
pable of recovering rapidly from the Xynthia-induced flood-
ing, there is no certainty that it would be the same if flooding 
affected a larger area9. If the number of stricken towns had 
been greater, resources would have been more scattered and 
certainly less efficient. Managing the event was facilitated by 
the fact that the disruption only affected a fairly limited area 
6 This can be difficult to understand when applied to urban areas (see: 
Campanella, 2006) where recovery must be distinguished from rebuilding.
7 The tidal coefficient is the difference in height between consecutive high 
and low tides; excluding meteorological effects, the highest possible tidal 
coefficient is 118.
8  i.e. about 7 000 tonnes of waste in the two towns (Robin des Bois, 2010).
9 Note that in the exceptional situation of the flooding caused by Katrina in 2005 
in New Orleans, post-disaster waste was still partly visible in 2012 in the form 
of heaps. 
within the region covered by the household waste treatment 
syndicate. Its capacity to respond and adapt was therefore all 
the easier. It was the strong capacity of all the stakeholders to 
mobilise and coordinate on a larger regional level that gen-
erated the organisational resilience of the waste management 
system for the towns involved. 
Organisational resilience expresses the capacity for local 
conditions or local regions to mobilise general conditions or 
larger regions. This solidarity between levels is also a major 
factor of resilience that is generally reflected in the absorption 
and recovery dimensions of resilience. 
8.  developIng A ConCepTuAl ResIlIenCe 
Model: “BehInd The BARRIeRs 
ConCepTuAl Model”.
Resilience, a concept borrowed from other disciplines (Lhom-
me et al., 2010), places risk management within a dynamic ap-
proach focused on adaptation. This represents a shift in the 
way risk management has been approached within urban en-
gineering. Present management is based essentially on a stat-
ic view relying generally on Operational Safety, whereas what 
is now needed is a move towards integrating information about 
the whole risk timeline in terms of prevention, crisis, and post-
crisis. Regional organisation and integrating malfunctions are 
also major elements of organisational resilience. The research 
we carried out, primarily on the subject of urban resilience to 
flood risks, shows that the concept of resilience combines four 
complementary criteria: cognitive resilience, functional re-
silience, correlative resilience, and organisational resilience. 
This view, stemming from an analysis of various methods and 
experiments, can be represented in the form of a schematic 
model (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Behind the Barriers Conceptual Model
A model is an abstraction that simplifies the actual system 
under study (Coquillard & Hill, 1997). The conceptual model 
represents a generalised view of urban resilience. It incorpo-
rates information from numerous sources, often linked to the 
specific risk of flooding in urban areas. 
The conceptual model proposed here includes the technical 


























system under study, urban dependence on the system, 
participants’ knowledge, and regional organisation. It provides 
information on the methods or principles helping to achieve 
a result and therefore supplies a conceptual framework 
to implement a resilience strategy. It does not define the 
technology or actions required to implement the established 
strategy, since they depend on context and therefore tend to 
change, but it does represent the global structure of urban 
resilience.
Such a model has several aims:
•	conveying a common conceptualisation, providing 
references for mediation, exchanges, and description; 
•	helping to develop a framework for analysis of the 
relevance of existing rules; 
•	helping guide resilience strategies.
Even though the terms cognitive resilience, functional 
resilience and organisational resilience may appear in other 
fields, using this conceptual model outside the field of urban 
areas and technical systems cannot be done without specific 
studies to determine its validity and relevance. Its scope, 
however, extends beyond the specific risk of flooding. The 
development of the conceptual model and the analysis of 
technical system resilience in this article are not based on the 
specific flood degradation mode. The elements remain valid 
for any risk affecting large areas that entails an attack on large 
parts of a network, such as earthquakes, storms, landslides, 
avalanches, technological hazards, etc.. The model will have to 
be tested for other risks, such as prolonged droughts, forest 
fires, terrorism, insect infestation, transport of hazardous 
materials, epidemics, etc.. 
9. ConClusIon
Two major advances should be recalled when asserting that 
resilience is a key component of risk mitigation objectives. 
One is conceptual: over the last two decades natural hazard 
analysis, traditionally focused on uncertainty and vulnerability, 
has extended to the concept of resilience, marking a major 
epistemological change. The second one, consequently, is 
methodological: moving from a restrictive quantitative techno-
centered view of vulnerability to one that includes systemic 
aspects, integrating technical system approaches that are 
qualitative, “socio-centered” and semi-quantitative.
It is difficult today, however, to apply the concept of resilience 
to urban planning, since it is essentially concerned with the 
design of so-called resilient buildings. When a so-called 
“resilient” approach is applied to technical systems, it is 
usually highly restrictive and strives to achieve reliability by 
adopting service continuity objectives. One of the reasons for 
this restrictive view of resilience in the context of technical 
systems is certainly linked to governance that separates the 
development and management of each technical system. 
Considering the links between technical systems, urban 
morphology, and participants is certainly an avenue to explore. 
Resilience then takes on a new dimension, and simultaneously 
becomes synonymous with: 
•	knowledge of risk, culture of risk;
•	reliability of critical infrastructures, generally opposed to 
the concept of vulnerability;
•	integrated management of resources and adaptation 
capacities deployable during the crisis in order to 
compensate for dysfunctions of usual services;
•	the capacity to adapt service needs to the ability of 
technical services to meet them;
•	post-event recovery and rebound. 
To fulfill these objectives, resilience must work through 
measures applied at different spatial and temporal scales 
(Serre et al., 2013). The challenge is to prepare the existing city 
for risks and to design new districts and new forms of urban 
planning with a view to future risk adaptation. 
Preparing for risk and seeking resilience without the help of 
a conceptual model is possible: the numerous participants in 
the field of risk management are proof of it daily. However, 
preparing for risk doesn’t only mean implementing prevention 
measures; what is required is an analysis of the most 
appropriate actions and knowing what attitudes to adopt in 
crisis and post-crisis contexts. Conceptual models help to 
structure participants’ thinking and target or guide priority 
actions. They do not determine standard solutions. The 
diverse criteria listed in the model, and the multiplicity of 
possible answers, match the given objective of respecting the 
technical, urban, and regional context. The conceptual model 
is integrated in the shift in risk management paradigm that 
advocates to not simply combat the hazard, but rather to live 
with it by minimizing negative impacts (Pasche & Geisler, 
2005). It describes a vision of resilience, particularly for urban 
technical systems, and can thus contribute to modernising 
urban engineering practices.
Some of the resilience strategies can be implemented in 
parallel with technical system maintenance cycles, as well 
as with urban changes and renewal (Zevenbergen, 2007; 
Veerbeek et al., 2010). Resilience does however entail a cost if 
adaptation is included in urban dynamics; some studies show 
that this cost appears to be very low in the medium term (Van 
de Ven et al., 2011). 
Current experiments with the “Behind The Barriers 
Conceptual Model” in various studies and the debate within 
groups of young researchers are the first tests to validate 
the model and develop the formalism that facilitates its 
application. Approaching the concept of resilience through 
its “action” dimension is a must for numerous regions, but 
attention should be taken that the issue of strategy evaluation 
and sustainability is not forgotten (Lallau, 2011).
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